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Legally Speaking
from page 38
The ResearchGate organization does recognize that it relies on authors to increase the
traffic to the website that receives revenues and
investments from venture capital. The organization knows that uploading and downloading
published journal articles are illegal and the
organization encouraged interested persons in
the academic community to upload their work
and join the networking site.
The organization understands that providing
a platform for academic authors to submit their
works can have copyright infringement issues.
Yet, authors do submit their works, despite
knowing that they may have given the rights
to the works to a publisher. However, this is
not always the case, as co-authors may have
submitted the work without the other author’s
knowledge. A reason authors submit their works
to the networking site is to provide their works to
as many people as possible. Plus, some authors
may have to meet tenure requirements, which
would be beneficial if the authors that could
provide statistical information on the citation
of the work through ResearchGate.
Despite being the creators of the work,
authors are not included in any of the lawsuits
involving copyright infringement. David Hansen, J.D., an Associate Librarian for Research,
Collections and Scholarly Communication at
Duke University has discussed the lack of
recognition of academic authors during the
legal battles between the scholarly publishers
and the professional networking organizations.

In his blog, “Giving the Authors a Voice in
Litigation? An ACS v. ResearchGate Update”
on February 14, 2019, Hansen noted that
through numerous copyright lawsuits between
publishers and other large organizations that
the courts proceed “without much input at all
from the actual authors of the works that form
the basis of those lawsuits.”
Interestingly, the organizations are having legal battles of copyrights that involve
millions of dollars, while the authors that
have created work, mostly likely for little or
no income, have no say in the lawsuits nor is
there any financial reward should either party
of the lawsuit win a settlement. Possibly, the
outcome of these lawsuits will eventually take
in consideration of the author’s work and their
desire to provide relevant information and
research to the masses, such as the concept
of scholarly communication that open access
to information can be vital in science, the
humanities, and for society.
The lawsuits are providing awareness of
the issues that have arisen in part to the new
technology, the influx of new journals, and
the networking sites, as well as the authors in
context to copyright. Other countries, such
as China, Africa, and India, are also working
toward better ways of providing open access
to scholarly works, which could be significant
in advocating for authors and supporters of
scholarly communication. In addition, the
lawsuits could also be an opportunity for
academic authors to negotiate and create new
policies for how academic works are published
and provided to the public. Libraries also have
the opportunity to provide a voice in how they

can acquire academic works and provide the
works for their patrons.
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Cases of Note — Disparaging Trademarks Are Free
Speech
Column Editor: Bruce Strauch (The Citadel, Emeritus) <bruce.strauch@gmail.com>
MATAL, INTERIM DIR. U.S. PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE V. TAM. 137
S.Ct. 1744 (2017).
“Chinatown Dance Rock” band “The
Slants” applied for federal trademark protection for their name. All were Asian-Americans
from Portland. They claimed to feel the derogatory term could be “reclaimed” and drained
of its denigrating force.
And they must have gotten that language
from a college professor. Or perhaps it’s
learned in grade school in Portlandia.
At any rate, they have a niche popularity
with the subculture of Otaku, which is Japanese
for “geek” or “nerd” and particularly refers
to manga obsessives.
Their music is described as synth-pop
similar to “Chvrches” and
“I Am X.” Their influences
are ’80s bands like “Duran
Duran,” “Depeche Mode,”
and “The Cure.”
The term “slant” refers to
the epicanthic fold or skin fold
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of the upper eyelid, common but not universal
among Asians. And was once a common slur.
And our gang of rockers has albums named
“The Yellow Album” and “Slanted Eyes,
Slanted Hearts.”
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
denied the application based on 15 U.S.C.
§1052(a). It prohibits trademarks that may
“disparage … or bring … into contempt or
disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.”
Well, that’s pretty obviously a loser if you
want to stop reading right here. Can I have
Little Bighorn Beer with George Custer on it
stuck full of arrows?
Trademark protection is designed for
distinctive marks — words, names, symbols
etc. — that distinguish one artisan’s goods from another’s.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Brothers, Inc.,
529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000).
This helps consumers
find desired products without confusion and protects the

vendor’s good will. Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar
Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
Trademark protection is ancient in origin
and came here with the Common Law. For
most of the 19th century, it was the province
of the states. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780-782 (1992).
Congress decided to wade in in 1870, and
the Lanham Act of 1946 provided for federal
registration. Lanham bars marks that are
“merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive” of goods. §1052(e)(1).
More to the point, it has a “disparagement
clause” that bars marks “which may disparage
… persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs,
or national symbols, or bring them into contempt or disrepute.” §1052(a). The PTO asks
whether the mark may be disparaging to a substantial composite — though not necessarily a
majority — of the referenced group.
Who dreamed that up? Think 1946. The
year before saw the birth of the United Nations,
a dream of world government since Woodrow
continued on page 40
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Wilson. Franklin Roosevelt conceived of
the body during WWII, began describing the
Allied Powers as the “United Nations.” He
was determined to join the world together
in a love-fest of happy-clappy democracies.
Modeled on us, of course.
I’m totally guessing. And I sure can’t be
bothered to delve into the Congressional record
on the subject.
But I bet a lot of it had to do with not offending the symbols of foreign nations.
Strauch’s nonsense speculations aside …
§1052(a) has been around, used inconsistently. And the PTO has made it clear it
doesn’t care if the applicant is a member of
the disparaged group or has good intentions.
Yet the PTO has admitted that “disparaging” is “highly subjective and, thus, general
rules are difficult to postulate.” Harjo v.
Pro-Football Inc., 50 USPQ 2d 1705, 1737
(TTAB 1999).
And that was before the Internet outrage
mobs could get in a frenzy over a “Men Working” sign.
But incredibly, the PTO didn’t survey a
whole bunch of Asians to find a substantial
composite. They based their ruling upon a

quote from Urbandictionary.com and — wait
for it — a picture of Miley Cyrus pulling her
eyes back into a slanting shape while seated
next to an Asian.
Tam was quoted in the media as saying
Asians thought it all quite funny; only white
people balked at it.
Well, the dogged Tam contested the denial
before the examining attorney, the PTO’s
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. Then he
went to federal court where they chose to sit en
banc to find the disparagement clause violated
the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause and
was unconstitutionally vague.
No kidding.
PTO filed a petition for cert which was
granted.

Supreme Court

Before that august body, the PTO argued
trademarks were government speech, not
private speech. And the Free Speech Clause
doesn’t regulate gov speak. Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009).
Government can’t regulate speech in ways
that favor a viewpoint at the expense of others.
But gov has its own viewpoints and couldn’t
function if it self-applied that rule.
Trademarks are created by the owner, maintained by same, and removed from the register
if cancelled by the owner. It is far-fetched to
call it government speech. Government would

be endorsing a vast array of commercial products and services, many of them contradictory.
We have registrations for both “Abolish Abortion” and “I Stand With Planned Parenthood.”
What kind of govt. drivel would be put
forward by “make.believe” (Sony), “Think
different” (Apple), “Just Do It (Nike)?
Anyhow, registration does not mean approval. See In re Old Glory Condom Corp.,
26 USPQ 2d 1216, 1220, n.3 (TTAB 1993).
That’s kind of cute, even without reading
the case.
“If there’s a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988).
Parks and monuments convey government
messages, but not trademarks. And if you
pushed this idea too far, a copyright would
make a book into government speech.
And doubtless you’re aware of the Washington Redskins brou-ha-ha. They had their
trademark cancelled, but the Tam case obliged
the appeals court to vacate the decision. So
don’t imagine you can sell pirated Redskins
gear.

Questions & Answers — Copyright Column
Column Editor: Laura N. Gasaway (Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill School
of Law, Chapel Hill, NC 27599; Phone: 919-962-2295; Fax: 919-962-1193) <laura_gasaway@unc.edu>
www.unc.edu/~unclng/gasaway.htm
QUESTION: A prison librarian asks
about placing sound recordings on a server
so that individual inmates are able to listen
to the recordings via the server.
ANSWER: Individual listening to sound
recordings is fair use. There are a couple of
caveats, however. The recording should be
available to one inmate at a time or played in
one living area even if multiple inmates are in
the room. There should also be no ability for
inmates to download the sound recording or
share copies electronically.
QUESTION: An academic librarian asks
why publishers object to controlled digital
lending.
ANSWER: Controlled digital lending
(CDL) is based on the idea that it is fair use
for libraries to digitize printed books that they
have legally acquired and to lend those digital
copies under restrictions similar to those physical copies of books such as lending only one
copy of the book at a time for a defined loan
period. The Internet Archives has been doing
this for some time, as have some other libraries
even for works that are still under copyright.
Publishers and authors certainly have noticed this movement, and they claim that CDL
is systematic infringement that negatively
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affects the incentives the Copyright Act
provides them. Publishers argue that
they are now making out-of-print
works available digitally under
license agreements and CDL
interferes with exploitation
of the copyright and this new
source of income for them. A
number of publishers’ group
have joined in objecting to CDL including the
Authors Guild, the National Writers Union,
the Association of American Publishers, the
International Publishers Association and the
U.K.’s Society of Authors.
Publishers have repeatedly questioned the
Internet Archives, and according to the Association of American Publishers, the Internet
Archives has inconsistently responded to take
down notices under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. Publishers do not accept that
CDL is the functional equivalent to hard copy
lending. Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act is
the first sale doctrine under which libraries lend
physical books in their collections. It provides
that once someone has legally acquired a copy
of a physical work, he or she may dispose of
that copy however he or she chooses. The
doctrine does not authorize reproduction of
the work, however.

Therefore, the first question is whether digitizing a
work without permission
of the copyright owner is
fair use. Traditionally, the
answer is no. The owner
determines the format in
which a work is made available and users are not permitted
to reproduce it or to change that format. It is
certainly understandable that librarians would
be attracted to the idea that digital copies are no
different from physical copies. This idea may
not be supported by the Act, however, or an
important recent court decision. The Register
of Copyrights has repeatedly opined that there
is no first sale doctrine for digital works. (See
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/
dmca_executive.html). In addition, in a report on
orphan works, the Copyright Office concluded,
“there is broad agreement that no colorable fair
use claim exists [for] providing digital access to
copyrighted works in their entirety.”
In Capitol Records v. ReDigi, (910 F.3d
649 (2d Cir. 2018)), the court affirmed the
district court’s decision that finding that ReDigi
infringed copyright through its service that
allowed the resale of iTunes files. The court
continued on page 41
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